Essay: US Somali operation
The US Somali operations had their share of failures prompted by the pathetic images of starving Somalis. The sight of thousands of malnourished children made the primary goal of providing security to aid in free distribution of relief supplies ended in the quest to make Somalis form a government, which in itself ended in a miserable failure (Richburg, 1994). This failure was practically as a result of the mismatching of ends ways and means.
The aim of rebuilding Somalia cost the US military the lives of 130 peacekeepers in addition to the two-million dollars expenditure daily spent by the UN on Somalis. The Operation Restore Hope as it was called failed to rebuild Somalia but instead found itself in the thick of internal Somali politics, a field that was outside the scope of the operation and also that which the operation lacked the know-how in dealing with it. The harsh realities of politics and large quantities of resources used in Somalia made the United States to abandon its efforts. The ends that were expected had to be shelved as they apparently became too far from the means and ways of the United Nations and the United States. All the investments in terms of time and resources went to waste as more of the original problem remained unsolved. Following therefore from these realities on the ground, it is justifiable to say that the technical scope of the know- how on the side of the military was shallow (Schmitt, 1995). The lack of readiness for the unknown situations that may be encountered in operations grounded the otherwise well thought of operation. The military should be all rounded, versed with various political landscapes of the target countries of operations and also ready for any eventualities which they must nonetheless ready to face.